

SECRET

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee

20 May 1980

25X1A MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
Chairman

25X1A FROM: [REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Intelligence to  
Foreign Officials

REFERENCE: DCI Memo to NFIB, dated 9 May 1980,  
same subject

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.
2. Substance: I think SECOM just lost its charter (DCID 1/1I) responsibilities to review and formulate policies and procedures governing the release of intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations and to ensure net advantage to the United States.

The DCI's memorandum to NFIB of 9 May 1980, (copy attached), designated the DCI's Deputy for Collection Tasking as agent for developing Community positions on the policy for the exchange of intelligence information. For those proposals which involve sensitive technical intelligence information,

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When  
Separated From Attachment

[REDACTED]  
Copy 3 of 3

25X1

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

SECRET

the DCI directs the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX to provide guidelines and policy recommendations. The DCI has designated his Deputy for National Foreign Assessment as his agent for reviewing those proposals which involve the release of finished intelligence for substantive content and net advantage to the national security and to act for him as the approving officer.

3. Comment: I think this policy change came about for several reasons.

a. SECOM's lack of action on this issue over the years created a policy/action void that DoD was moving to fill with an expanded National Disclosure Policy (covering intelligence as well as military information) to make more intelligence available to foreign military services.

b. The decompartmentation of significant amounts of imagery and technical intelligence in consequence of APEX and use of this material in foreign briefings without compliance with old standing rules.

c. The time was right for the DCI to come out with another move toward standardization of controls in the Community.

4. Ramifications: We will have to consider changing DCID 1/11 to reflect these new taskings.

There will be an increased interest from COMIREX in securing advisory services of a knowledgeable security officer. I doubt whether SIGINT Committee will ask for a security advisor in view of their track record in this regard.

5. Suggestions: We discuss this issue at the next SECOM meeting.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_\_



25X1A

Distribution:

Copy 1 - C/SECOM  
Copy 2 - SECOM Subj  
Copy ③ - SECOM Chrono



25X1

SECRET

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200080012-0

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200080012-0